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ABSTRACT 
This research provides a Situational Influence Assessment Module (SIAM) 
software model for assessing the capability of a country to conduct sustained, 
offensive cyber warfare.  The SIAM Cyber Warfare Capability Model identifies a 
process to quantify the baseline information needed to evaluate a complex 
problem.  The model is a tool and allows analysts to understand the reasoning 
behind the assessments made by the model.  The SIAM Cyber Warfare 
Capability Model is meant to be used as a mechanism to examine in detail the 
factors that should indicate a country’s cyber warfare capabilities. 
The SIAM Cyber Warfare Capability Model is a four level, hierarchical 
model that relies on user-defined relationships (links) to inform and assess 
whether a country has the capability to conduct, sustained offensive cyber 
warfare.  The model requires the user provide a confidence value for the 
information contained within the Initial Nodes at the lowest level, level four, which 
will propagate up through the model based on user defined link strengths.  The 
model accounts for the cumulative effect that multiple inputs may have on a 
nation state’s cyber warfare capability through Causal Strengths (CAST) Logic.  
The analyst is also able to alter the information contained in the level four nodes 
along with the strength of the links, as more information is made available.  This 
provides for a readily updateable model that considers multiple indicators and 
relationships. 
The SIAM Cyber Warfare Capability Model required 15,010 evaluations in 
its design once the four level structure was adopted.  During the development of 
the model, we constrained ourselves to work within the data considerations 
provided by the sponsor.  The model requires the user to decide the relative 
importance of pertinent considerations, as defined within the model, when 
defining the level four Initial Nodes.  The model becomes easily expandable if the 
analyst determines there is a key consideration missing for an Initial Node, it can 
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be incorporated and documented.  Furthermore, the model is readily 
transferrable.  The models link strengths and reasoning are well documented 
allowing for it to be applied to a variety of nations and utilized by multiple 
organizations. 
The SIAM Cyber Warfare Capability Model, was delivered to the sponsor, 
who then shared the model with other members of the Intelligence Community 
(IC).  The sponsor endorsed the approach in our model and said it provided a 
solid foundation for future modeling efforts.  The sponsor used the Cyber Warfare 
Capability Model to account for resources in a separate model that analyzes a 
state’s cyber program by taking a capability equals sophistication times 
resources approach.  We view this feedback and subsequent use of our model in 
a separate product as a validation of the methodology employed in the Cyber 
Warfare Capability Model. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The threat of foreign nation states conducting offensive cyber attacks 
against the United States is a National Security matter due to the ever-increasing 
reliance on information technologies in the modern world.  This necessitates the 
ability to evaluate the offensive cyber capabilities possessed by a given nation.  
Nation states have the capability to leverage cyber capabilities with all source 
intelligence support, extensive resources, and potentially a kinetic attack to 
increase the level of impact.  The potential effects of a cyber attack could be 
devastating if the United States is not prepared for them.  Thus, in the ever-
evolving threat environment, having an understanding of potential adversaries 
and their associated capabilities is the first step in defense.  The capability to 
assess a nation state’s sustained cyber capabilities is critical and has been 
recognized across the Intelligence Community.  The research conducted and 
methodology employed is in support of a U.S. government agency in the 
intelligence community. 
The ability to assess a nation state’s offensive cyber capabilities, to 
include Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation 
(CNE), is a high priority for the Intelligence Community (IC) as the national and 
military infrastructures are increasingly reliant on information technology.  A 
consistent methodology for conducting such an assessment does not exist. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis will focus on developing a model for assessing whether a 
Nation State has sustainable offensive cyber capability.  
The evaluation of a potential adversary’s offensive Computer Network 
Operations (CNO) capabilities will be assessed using a Situational Influence 
Assessment Module (SIAM).  The advantage of using SIAM is that for this work, 
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a model can be constructed that quantifiably identifies data points regarding the 
capacity for another nation state to launch a cyber attack.  The ability to 
determine another nation state’s capabilities would be very valuable if a conflict 
with the adversarial country ever broke out.  Moreover, the model may help 
identify key warning indicators, and help focus limited resources in determining a 
target’s sustained, offensive cyber capacity, potentially avoiding a strategic 
surprise. 
The model does not address intent, and requires the analysts to have 
prerequisite knowledge of the target country.  This thesis takes an overarching 
approach in the evaluation of key elements that effect cyber capabilities in order 
to help the analyst gain further understanding of the system being modeled, a 
nation state’s cyber apparatus.  The model helps develop a methodology in 
which a thorough evaluation of potential indicators is taken into account.  The 
goal is to provide a baseline process of determining a nation state’s cyber 
capabilities without completely overwhelming the analyst.   
This thesis examines several factors that directly or indirectly contribute to 
a nation state’s cyber capabilities.  It is through this holistic approach, coupled 
with the knowledge of the analysts, that greater understanding of these 
capabilities is gained.  This addresses a concern that there is a significant lack of 
net assessment concerning the trends in offensive CNO capacity.  The Cyber 
Warfare Capability Model may be able to identify early warning indicators for 
offensive cyber capabilities.  As a result, the analyst will be able to focus on key 
nodes and relationships, rather than having to determine exactly how a single 
factor impacts a complex system.  The manner in which the model is defined 
may lead to new insights in how individual considerations fit into the overall 
assessment.   
C. BRIEF EXPLANATION OF METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is focused on assessing the offensive cyber capabilities of 
foreign nation states.  This is done using a SIAM model that is based on Causal 
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Strengths (CAST) Logic.  The SIAM Cyber Warfare Capability Model will provide 
a net assessment that takes a holistic approach examining policy, doctrine, 
technical ability, command and control, computer network infrastructure, facilities, 
and intelligence (Rosen & Smith, 1996).  The Capablility Model is unique in that it 
integrates every element that is deemed significant, defines their relationships, 
and provides an assessment of the selected nation state’s sustained CNA/CNE 
capacity.  The advantage of using SIAM is that it will provide not only a net 
assessment, but also documentation for the underlying source material that is 
easily accessed by the analysts or end user.  This information is available for the 
current decision makers and is readily updatable, capable of being refined in 
future assessments.  Once causal relationships are effectively defined, and 
because all of the documentation is contained within, the Cyber Warfare 
Capability Model becomes a very powerful tool that can be transferred to 
different organizations and used by analysts at each. 
D. THESIS STRUCTURE 
Five chapters and three appendices comprise this thesis: 
• Chapter I—Introduction:  Establishes the goals for this thesis.  
Identifies the motivation and purpose behind conducting this 
research. 
• Chapter 2—Background:  Provides an overview of SIAM and the 
modeling process.   
• Chapter 3—Methodology:  Discusses the development and 
application of principles used to evaluate a Nation State’s sustained 
offensive cyber capabilities.  This fuses the academic world with 
real world analyst feedback and application. 
• Chapter 4—Cyber Warfare Capability Model:  This is a 
comprehensive look at the model and the categories that inform it. 
• Chapter 5—Conclusions and Recommendations:  Explains the 
conclusions and provides recommendation for future applications 
and research. 
• Appendix A—List of 79 Potential Considerations:  Lists the data an 
analyst should consider when populating the initial nodes of the 
model. 
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• Appendix B—Mapping Considerations to Nodes:  Provides a quick 
reference table listing each node with the model and which 
considerations should be examined for each. 
• Appendix C—CNO Capability Model Guide:  A basic How-To guide 




A. SITUATIONAL INFLUENCE ASSESSMENT MODULE (SIAM) 
SIAM is a mature software tool that allows analysts and decision makers 
to simplify the analysis of complex issues using an influence net, which is a user-
created model that depicts events and/or assumptions and their causal 
interrelationships.  It provides users the capability to display issues graphically in 
order to view the complex cause-and-effect relationships and to easily 
manipulate or modify the events as new information becomes available (Figure 
1).  The software also provides comparative quantitative assessment techniques 
to evaluate the relative influencing impacts of the relationships (Science 
Applications International Corporation, 1995). 
 
 
Figure 1.   Graphic representation of the model 
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B. SIAM NODES 
The basic elements of an influence net in SIAM are nodes and links.  
Nodes are the events, ideas, or assumptions that have an influence on the 
outcome of an overall issue.  This issue or question to be evaluated by the SIAM 
model forms the Root Node of the influence network.  The Root Node does not 
influence other events, but rather is the result of causal effects of the other nodes 
in the network. The SIAM Cyber Warfare Capability Model is a four-layered 
model, with the Root Node being the level 1 node.  The other nodes are either 
Parent Nodes (causes) or Child Nodes (effects) and exist on lower layers.  The 
lowest level of the model, level 4, consists of Initial Nodes, which are the primary 
assumptions in the model and are not influenced by any other nodes, only by the 
data entered by the user.  All of the Initial Nodes function as Parent Nodes to the 
nodes that sit at level 3.  The level 3 nodes are Internal Nodes that are between 
the Initial Nodes and the level 2 nodes.  The level 3 Internal Nodes function as 
both Parent Nodes for the nodes that sit at level 2 and Child Nodes to the level 4 
nodes.  The level 2 nodes are Parent Nodes for the Root Node, but are Child 
Nodes to the level 3 nodes.  Each node within the model is assigned a belief 
value, which is a statement as to the likelihood that the event represented by the 
node will occur or whether the assumption is true or false (Figure 2).  Users set 
the belief values for the level four, Initial Nodes, manually because there is no 
information that SIAM can use to determine their beliefs based on influence.  
Belief values for Internal Nodes and Root Nodes are determined by SIAM based 
on the cumulative effect of all influencing nodes’ belief values and the 




Figure 2.   Belief value slider bar 
C. SIAM LINKS 
The other basic element of the influence net is the link, which is the 
representation of the causal relationship between Parent Nodes (causes) and 
Child Nodes (effects).  The user assigns a strength value for each link within the 
influence net (Figure 3).  This strength value represents the degree to which the 
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Parent Node influences the Child Node.  Each link can have one of two 
influencing effects.  A reinforcing influence means that, as the belief in the Parent 
Node increases, the belief in the Child Node also increases.  A reversing 
influence means that, as the belief in the Parent Node increases, the belief in the 
Child Node decreases (Science Applications International Corporation, 1995). 
 
 




D. SIAM BASICS 
Once the user has assigned the belief values to the Initial Nodes and the 
strength values to the links, SIAM is ready to perform its comparative analysis. 
The analysis takes the belief value of the Initial Nodes together with the user-
assigned link strengths to calculate the belief values of the Internal Nodes and a 
final assessment of the Root Nodes.  SIAM uses the traditional influence net 
propagation algorithm based on Causal Strength (CAST) logic, which is a 
specific implementation of the more general class of Bayesian propagation 
algorithms.  These types of algorithms are beneficial when the outcome is highly 
complex and cannot be modeled using static dependency logic rules.  Bayesian 
algorithms account for the available information, as well as the potential lack of 
information about an event or an assumption.  This allows for the evaluation of 
the cumulative effect that multiple causes may have on a single event (Rosen & 
Smith, 1996). 
E. BENEFITS OF SIAM ANALYSIS 
Analyzing a complex issue or answering a complex question can be a 
largely nonintuitive task where the analyst must consider a large amount of data, 
much of which, when considered individually, provides little insight into the final 
assessment of the issue.  The more complex the issue or question, the more 
likely the individual factors affecting the outcome are going to be vague and 
contribute less.  Crucial to the analysis is determining which of the many pieces 
of data are important, and understanding the corresponding relationships.  SIAM 
simplifies this process by providing the user with a set of tools that allow for easy 
organization and documentation of large amounts of information, visualization of 
the strength of relationships between causes and effects, and identification of 
elements where the model is lacking sufficient information.  Most importantly, 
however, is the ability for SIAM to identify the causal elements with the greatest 
chance to affect the overall outcome (Science Applications International 
Corporation, 1995).  With these so-called pressure nodes identified, analysts 
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know where to focus limited resources for information collection and further 
analysis, and decision makers know where to employ capabilities in order to 
obtain the desired outcome—allocating the appropriate resources to the right 
event at the right time. 
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III. METHODOLOGY  
A.  ACADEMIC REVIEW  
The approach taken in the development of the Cyber Warfare Capability 
Model was driven by academic research as well as sponsor needs.  An academic 
review of previous work in the field was conducted to understand the process 
other scholars had taken in considering CNO capabilities.  Our work is heavily 
influenced by previous work conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
in 2004–2005 on the CNO threat of foreign countries.  That work, which was 
supervised by Dr. Dorothy Denning and conducted by Lieutenants Christopher 
Brown, Jason Patterson and Matthew Smith, focused on developing a reliable 
methodology of assessing the CNO threat of foreign countries (Denning, 2007).  
The methodology grouped indicators of CNO capabilities into four categories: 
• Information technology industry and infrastructure 
• Academic and research community 
• Government and foreign relations 
• Hacking and cyber attacks 
The study played a large role in shaping our early perceptions regarding 
CNO threats and led us to realize that the presence of a computer network 
defense (CND) capability may correspond with some CNA or CNE capability.  
While CNE/CNA require a different application of knowledge, it is undoubtedly 
related to CND.  Essentially, knowledge of how systems are attacked is strongly 
correlated to building strong defenses.  Thus, CND can be used as an indicator 
as it implies a certain level of knowledge regarding CNA/E, even if it has not 





research.  The methodology employed by our research was a categorical 
approach and grouped indicators into four major classes: 
• Government 
• Private Industry 
• Science and Technology 
• Academics and Research 
Additionally, we drew heavily upon the research conducted by the Institute 
for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College (Billo & Chang, 2004). The 
Dartmouth group focused on categorizing indicators into two sections.  Category 
one consisted of direct links to cyber warfare capabilities, while category two was 
based on indirect links and circumstantial evidence such as the IT infrastructure 
(Billo & Chang, 2004).  The Cyber Warfare Capability Model captures direct links 
as well secondary considerations; however, it relies on the analyst to determine 
the level of influence exerted.  This will be explained further in the next section. 
Both studies provided significant insight, which we used as a baseline for 
thinking about the CNO capabilities of a foreign country.  The studies were 
conducted using real countries and source data, which provided further validation 
to these approaches. The real breakthrough in the previous studies was not the 
result of the information obtained, but rather the methodology employed.  Both 
the NPS and Dartmouth studies provided invaluable insights in how to think 
about CNO.  Neither, however, attempted to quantify their assessments of the 
countries they examined. This is where the Cyber Warfare Capability Model 
differs from previous work and provides a distinct contribution.  The SIAM model 
provides a means of making a quantifiable assessment of a country’s cyber 




B. DOTMLPF ANALYSIS 
We met with the sponsor to discuss the approach we were considering for 
the Cyber Warfare Capability Model.  The sponsor, while appreciating the 
approach,  envisioned a level of analysis much deeper than just looking at the 
model from a categorical perspective.  The sponsor wanted a model that would 
direct the analysts to answer the question: Does said Nation State have the 
capability to conduct sustained, offensive cyber warfare? 
The sponsor suggested using a modified DOTMLPF approach.  
DOTMLPF Analysis identifies possible nonmateriel solutions as a result of a 
capabilities-based assessment (CBA) to satisfy a capability gap (Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011).  The modified DOTMLPF analysis considered cyber 
related factors, tweaking the traditional approach of DOTMLPF: doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 
facilities.  We combined the categorical methodology with a DOTMLPF Analysis 
in a hierarchal model to take an all-inclusive approach to determining whether a 
CNO capacity exists.  The categories exist on the second level of the model and 
are composed of sectors (objects) for consideration on level three.  Each sector 
is then analyzed using the modified DOTMLPF Analysis at level four.  The 
cumulative effect of the analysis is propagated through the model based on Initial 
Nodes and link strengths assigned by the analysts.  The following is a breakdown 
of the modified DOTMLPF Analysis which are each represented by Initial Nodes 
on level 4: 
• Doctrine: The fundamental principles that guide the employment of 
forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. 
• Organization: A unit with varied functions enabled by a structure 
through which individuals cooperate systematically to accomplish a 
common mission and directly provide or support mission 
capabilities. 
• Training and Education: Training based on doctrine or tactics, 
techniques, and procedures to prepare forces or staffs to respond 
to strategic and operational requirements deemed necessary by 
 14 
leaders to execute their assigned missions; how we prepare to 
fight. 
• Materiel: All items necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and 
support units without distinction as to its application for 
administrative or operational purposes. 
• Financing: The level of financial support afforded to the 
organization to enable the other aspects of the DOTMLPF 
paradigm to mature. 
• Personnel: availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, 
and various contingency operations. 
• Facilities: real property; installations and industrial facilities that 
support cyber forces.  
• Research and Development: Creative work undertaken on a 
systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, and 
the use of this knowledge to devise new applications. 
• Sophistication: The level to which the capability has progressed in 
complexity and maturity. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  The actions of an organization that 
aid, protect, complement, or sustain a unit conducting cyber 
operations. 
The modified DOTMLPF Analysis enables a systems engineering 
approach to be taken in determining whether a country has a CNO capacity.  
Systems engineering is a top-down process of transforming requirements into an 
integrated solution.  The modified DOTMLPF Analysis is a very structured 
technique that forces the analyst to examine the problem from a multitude of 
angles.  The Cyberwarfare Capability Model accounts for dynamic variables in a 
quantifiable manner to meet the functional requirements of the sponsor. 
C. MODEL STRUCTURE (OBJECTS/TRAITS/CONSIDERATIONS)  
The Cyberwarfare Capability Model is a four level model that requires the 
analysts to define all relationships.  The analysts will provide data to the Initial 
Nodes at the lowest level, level four, which will propagate through the model and 
determine whether a country has the capacity to conduct sustained, offensive 
cyber operations.  Collaborating with the sponsor, an object-traits-considerations 
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framework was adopted to meet the objectives of the model.  The Root Node, 
which exists on level 1, is the question being evaluated by the model (Node 0– 
Country Possess a Sustained, Offensive Cyber Warfare Capability).  The SIAM 
model will account for the relative certainty that a country possesses the 
capability to conduct sustained, offensive cyber warfare based on the lower level 
nodes and link relationships.  The level of a country’s cyber warfare capability is 
directly linked to the sophistication of said capability.  Sophistication is addressed 
in the model as part of the modified DOTMLPF Analysis, informing the level 3 
objects.  The categories exist at level 2 and act as Parent Nodes to the Root 
Node by feeding information into level 1 node to determine whether a country 
possesses a sustained CNA capability (Figure 4).  The categories, defined in the 
Section A of this chapter, are Child Nodes to the level 3 nodes.  The level 3 
nodes are Internal Nodes, as well, and consist of objects contained within the 
four distinct level 2 categories.  Each category (level 2) consists of distinct 
objects (level 3) that contribute to a sector of the country’s ability to conduct 
sustained CNA activities (Figure 5).  The objects are Parent Nodes to the 
categories and inform them as such.  The model will require the analyst to 
determine the significance of the relationship between each node, as the 
influence that a node exerts could be target specific.  The amount of influence 
each object has is determined by the link strengths the analyst assigns between 
the level 1, level 2, and level 3 nodes.  However, the model presents a structured 
manner for the analyst to think about the problem as every object undergoes a 
modified DOTMLPF Analysis. 
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Figure 4.   Level 2 categories 
 
Figure 5.   Level 3 objects 
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The Initial Nodes are at the lowest level, level 4, and represent the traits, 
which make up the modified DOTMLPF Analysis.  Each object is a Child Node to 
the level 4 nodes, as each undergoes a modified DOTMLPF Analysis.  This 
means that each object has 10 Parent/Initial Nodes influencing it.  The Initial 
Nodes (traits) are informed by considerations, contained within the Initial Nodes 
comments.  There are 79 potential considerations that were considered when 
developing this model.  A thorough evaluation of all 79 potential considerations 
was conducted and as a result each trait (Initial Node) is assigned applicable 
considerations for the analyst to account for when assigning a belief value to the 
node (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6.   Informing considerations 
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The model requires the analyst to evaluate the considerations multiple 
times in the Initial Nodes.  This decision was made as a result of software design 
constraints.  It would have been ideal for the analyst to just assign a value to 
each of the 79 considerations once and let those values flow through the model.  
However, this would not be graphically manageable and would overwhelm the 
analyst as a result.  The layered design employed has two benefits.  First, the 
model is manageable for the analyst, as everything is categorized in a hierarchal 
manner.  The analyst is easily able to resolve inputs and see the correlation to 
the model.  Second, a consideration may have a different weight when 
considering disparate traits.  Further, the model becomes easily expandable if 
the analyst determines there is a key consideration missing for a level-4 trait 
(Initial Node), he/she can simply add it in and document it. 
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IV. CYBER WARFARE MODEL 
To begin, we considered the main factors that would influence a nation’s 
capability to conduct sustained, offensive cyber warfare.  This was considered 
strictly from the standpoint of a nation state.  The ability to conduct cyber warfare 
by groups other than actual nations (i.e., transnational criminal organizations, 
terrorists, amateur hackers and hacktivists) was not formally examined.  
However, in some instances, a nation’s ability to conduct cyber warfare depends 
heavily upon leveraging the talents of the above mentioned groups, so the model 
takes this into consideration at various points.  In considering the question  
at the nation state level, we determined the four main influences were 
government, private industry, science and technology, and academics and 
research (Figure 7). 
The modified DOTMLPF Analysis was used in analyzing each of the four 
main node families (level 2 nodes) by applying it to each object (level 3 node).  
This chapter highlights the key traits (level 4 nodes) for each object (level 3 node) 
based on the criterion that it contained the most considerations for the analyst to 
deliberate.  The model accounts for the full allocation of traits for each object, 
and the analyst has the ability to emphasize or deemphasize the traits’ 
importance by assigning link strengths.  The considerations can be direct or 
indirect influences to the traits they inform.  It should be noted that this is a gray 
model, meaning that none of the link strengths nor the initial node belief values 
have been assigned.  Based upon discussions with the sponsor, it was decided 
that this information would vary from country to country and an accurate 
assignment of link strengths and node belief values should be conducted on a 
country-by-country basis by the analyst familiar with that particular data set.  That 
way the analyst has the ability to decide the relative importance of the various 
factors for each country.  The Cyber Warfare Capability Model provides a 
systematic process for the analyst to approach the problem.  This chapter 
discusses in detail the analysis of each of these four families of nodes (level-2 
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nodes) and how they ultimately influence the root node of whether a country 
possesses a sustained, offensive cyber warfare capability. 
 
Figure 7.   Top level of Cyber Warfare Capability Model 
A. GOVERNMENT 
Acknowledging that the Cyber Warfare Capability Model considers the 
root question from the standpoint of a nation state, it is understandable that the 
largest node family is that of government.  This node encapsulates the efforts by 
the government or its agencies to develop and maintain a sustained, offensive 
cyber warfare capability.  The government node has eight parent nodes—nodes 
that have a causal influence on the government node (Figure 8).  These 
influences are the domestic intelligence service, the foreign intelligence service, 
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the signals intelligence service, the military intelligence service, a cyber-focused 
military command, homeland security network defense, law enforcement, and 
state control over the private sector. 
The most robust parent nodes within this family are the foreign intelligence 
service and the signals intelligence service, followed by a cyber-focused military 
command and homeland security network defense.  For a cyber warfare 
capability to be effective and efficient, a nation needs timely and accurate 
intelligence on its foreign adversaries and their networks.  Without effective 
foreign and signals intelligence services, the ability to conduct sustained, 
offensive cyber warfare will diminish greatly.  The U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) defines intelligence as the product resulting from collection, processing, 
integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information 
concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or 
areas of actual or potential operations (Department of Defense, 2011).  In his 
work for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, Rob Johnston defined intelligence as a secret state or group activity 
to understand or influence foreign or domestic entities (Johnston, 2005).  In the 
case of cyber warfare, the state would be the group conducting the intelligence 
and the foreign entities networks would be those that the state were trying first to 
understand, and then influence. 
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Figure 8.   Government node of the Cyber Warfare Capability Model 
1. Domestic Intelligence Service 
This node represents the presence of a domestic intelligence service, 
similar to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the British 
Security Service (MI5), the Israeli Shin Bet, the Russian Federal Security Service 
(FSB), or the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS).  The definition of 
domestic intelligence is intelligence relating to the activities or conditions inside a 
country that threaten that country’s security (Department of Defense, 2011).  For 
example, the FBI produces intelligence in support of its own investigative 
mission, national intelligence priorities and the needs of other customers (Federal 




enforcement, the intelligence gathered during their investigative operations 
undoubtedly aids the overall national cyber warfare mission, both offensively and 
defensively (“FBI Warns,” 2010). 
The domestic intelligence node is most heavily influenced by the traits of 
doctrine, facilities, sophistication and support to cyber operations.  In the model, 
when determining how each of the traits influences the domestic intelligence 
service and its support to the overall cyber warfare capability, the analyst should 
examine the listed considerations. 
• Doctrine:  (1) the level of state control of the tech sector, (2) the 
relationships between the government/intelligence services and the 
nation’s domestic corporations, (3) any operations against domestic 
opposition websites, (4) the level of concern over cybercrime and, 
(5) the overall information warfare (IW) program operations security 
(OPSEC) level. 
• Facilities:  (1) the midpoint SIGINT capability, (2) the covert 
communications capability, (3) the capability to create and run front 
companies and, (4) the number of classified networks in the 
government information technology (IT) infrastructure. 
• Sophistication:  (1) the acquisition of black market cyber tools, (2) 
the sophistication of the human intelligence (HUMINT) program, (3) 
the midpoint SIGINT capability, (4) the covert communications 
capability, (5) the capability to steal technology and make use of it 
outside of cyber operations, (6) the overall intelligence collection 
capabilities not related to cyber operations and, (7) the capability to 
remotely delete data from websites or computers. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  (1) the acquisition of black market 
cyber tools, (2) the midpoint SIGINT capability, (3) the relationships 
between government/intelligence services and the nation’s 
domestic corporations and, (4) the capability to remotely delete 
data from websites or computers. 
2. Foreign Intelligence Service 
This node represents the presence of a foreign intelligence service, similar 
to the United States (CIA), the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), the 
Israeli Mossad, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), or the Chinese 
MSS.  The definition of foreign intelligence is information relating to the 
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capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons 
(Department of Defense, 2011).  Having an effective foreign intelligence service 
is vital for an effective cyber warfare capability.  Cyberspace is the newly 
recognized fifth domain of warfare (along with air, land, sea, and space) 
(“Cyberwar,” 2010).  Perhaps more than any other domain of warfare, 
cyberspace requires detailed intelligence of the network infrastructure used by 
the adversary’s decision makers.  A nation’s foreign intelligence service is the 
organization best suited to collect and analyze this information, providing the 
signals intelligence service with leads for thorough technical exploitation.  As a 
recognized domain of warfare, the same rules apply for conducting warfare there.  
Without the necessary intelligence on the foreign networks, a cyber warfare 
capability could not exist. 
The foreign intelligence node is most heavily influenced by the traits of 
doctrine, organization, materiel, facilities, personnel, sophistication, and support 
to cyber operations.  In the model, when determining how each of the traits 
influences the foreign intelligence service and its support to the overall cyber 
warfare capability, the analyst should examine the listed considerations. 
• Doctrine:  (1) the relationships with other cyber actors, (2) the 
strength of nationalism in the population, (3) the relationships 
between the government/intelligence services and the nation’s 
domestic corporations, (4) whether any covert cyber activity has 
been detected, (5) diplomatic cyber initiatives and, (6) the overall 
IW program OPSEC level. 
• Organization:  (1) who has CNA release authority, (2) the 
clandestine infrastructure for remote operations, (3) the cyber 
training programs in the military/intelligence services and, (4) 
whether there are technologically savvy individuals serving in 
senior government positions. 
• Materiel:  (1) the covert communications capability, (2) any 
observation of traveling government IT technicians servicing 
information operations platforms abroad, (3) the clandestine 
infrastructure for remote operations, (4) the number of classified 
networks in the government IT infrastructure and, (5) any evidence 
of storage for massive amounts of collected cyber data. 
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• Facilities:  (1) the number of intelligence bases internationally, (2) 
the midpoint SIGINT capability, (3) the covert communications 
capability, (4) the clandestine infrastructure for remote operations, 
(5) the number of classified networks in the government IT 
infrastructure and, (6) any evidence of storage for massive amounts 
of collected cyber data. 
• Personnel:  (1) the linguistic capability, (2) the size of the hacker 
community, (3) the strength of nationalism in the population, (4) the 
number of cyber related contracts for bid, (5) any observation of 
travelling government IT technicians servicing information 
operations platforms abroad and, (6) whether there are 
technologically savvy individuals serving in senior government 
positions. 
• Sophistication:  (1) the acquisition of black market cyber tools, (2) 
the sophistication of the HUMINT program, (3) the midpoint SIGINT 
capability, (4) the covert communications capability, (5) the 
capability to steal technology and make use of it outside of cyber 
operations, (6) the overall intelligence collection capability not 
related to cyber operations, (7) the capability to remotely delete 
data from websites or computers, (8) any documented CNE 
successes and, (9) the undersea cable operations capability. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  (1) acquisition of black market 
cyber tools, (2) the size of the hacker community, (3) the 
sophistication of the HUMINT program, (4) the midpoint SIGINT 
capability, (5) the relationships between the 
government/intelligence services and the nation’s domestic 
corporations, (6) any covert cyber activity detected, (7) the 
observation of traveling government IT technicians servicing 
information operations platforms abroad, (8) the capability to 
remotely delete data from websites or computers, (9) any document 
CNE successes, (10) diplomatic cyber initiatives and (11) the 
undersea cable operations capability. 
3. Signals Intelligence Service 
This node represents the presence of a signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
service, similar to the United States National Security Agency (NSA), the British 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Israeli Intelligence 
Corps Unit 8200, the Russian FSB, or the Chinese Third and Fourth 
Departments of the General Staff.  SIGINT is defined as intelligence derived from 
communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals (Department of 
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Defense, 2011).  It is most likely through its SIGINT service that a nation 
conducting sustained, offensive cyber warfare will operate.  Resident here will 
likely be the technical expertise required to develop the understanding of the 
adversary network topology and operating systems for reconnaissance, 
exploitation and eventually attack. 
The signals intelligence node is most heavily influenced by the traits of 
doctrine, organization, materiel, facilities, research and development, 
sophistication, and support to cyber operations.  In the model, when determining 
how each of the traits influences the signals intelligence service and its support 
to the overall cyber warfare capability, the analyst should examine the listed 
considerations. 
• Doctrine:  (1) the level of state control of the tech sector, (2) the 
relationships with other cyber actors, (3) the role that information 
operations plays across the spectrum of conflict, (4) the use of 
offensive CNO to support operations outside of strategic 
information operations, (5) the relationships between the 
government/intelligence services and the nation’s domestic 
corporations, (6) any covert cyber activity detected, (7) any 
operations against domestic opposition websites, (8) any diplomatic 
cyber initiatives and, (9) overall IW program OPSEC level. 
• Organization:  (1) the presence of an information operations range 
infrastructure, (2) who has CNA release authority, (3) the 
clandestine infrastructure for remote operations, (4) any evidence 
of an Internet monitoring program, (5) the cyber training programs 
in the military/intelligence services and, (6) whether there are 
technologically savvy individuals serving in senior government 
positions. 
• Materiel:  (1) the presence of an IO range infrastructure, (2) the 
covert communications capability, (3) the level of botnet activity, (4) 
any observation of traveling government technicians servicing IO 
platforms abroad, (5) the clandestine infrastructure for remote 
operations, (6) the number of classified networks in the government 
IT infrastructure, (7) any evidence of storage for massive amounts 
of collected cyber data and, (8) a ranking in the top 100 of the 
world’s fastest computers. 
• Facilities:  (1) the number of intelligence bases internationally, (2) 
the presence of an IO range infrastructure, (3) the midpoint SIGINT 
capability, (4) the technological sophistication of the population, (5) 
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the covert communications capability, (6) the clandestine 
infrastructure for remote operations, (7) the number of classified 
networks in the government IT infrastructure and, (8) any evidence 
of storage for massive amounts of collected cyber data. 
• Research and Development:  (1) the acquisition of black market 
cyber tools, (2) the presence of an information operations IO range 
infrastructure, (3) the capability to steal technology and make use 
of it outside of cyber operations and, (4) the relationships between 
the government/intelligence services and the nation’s domestic 
corporations. 
• Sophistication:  (1) the acquisition of black market cyber tools, (2) 
the presence of an IO range infrastructure, (3) the midpoint SIGINT 
capability, (4) the presence of Silicon Valley-like high tech corridors, 
(5) the use of offensive CNO to support programs outside of 
strategic IO, (6) the covert communications capability, (7) the 
capability to steal technology and make use of it outside of cyber 
operations, (8) the overall intelligence collection capability not 
related to cyber operations, (9) the capability to remotely delete 
data from websites or computers, (10) any documented CNE 
successes and, (11) the undersea cable operations capability. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  (1) the acquisition of black market 
cyber tools, (2) the presence of an IO range infrastructure, (3) the 
midpoint SIGINT capability, (4) the presence of Silicon Valley-like 
high tech corridors, (5) the role that IO plays across the spectrum of 
conflict, (6) the relationships between the government/intelligence 
organizations and the nation’s domestic corporations, (7) any 
covert cyber activity detected, (8) the observation of traveling 
government technicians servicing IO platforms abroad, (9) the 
capability to remotely delete data from websites or computers, (10) 
evidence of a network mapping program, (11) any documented 
CNE successes, (12) evidence of an Internet monitoring program, 
(13) a ranking in the top 100 of the world’s fastest computers, (14) 
any diplomatic cyber initiatives and, (15) the undersea cable 
operations capability. 
4. Military Intelligence Service 
This node represents the presence of a national level military intelligence 
service, similar to the United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the 
British Defense Intelligence (DI), the Israeli Aman, the Russian Main Intelligence 
Directorate (GRU), or the Chinese Second Department of the General Staff.  
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Military intelligence is defined as intelligence on any foreign military or military-
related situation or activity, which is significant to military policymaking or the 
planning and conduct of military operations and activities (Department of 
Defense, 2011).  Cyber warfare, as with any form of warfare, is conducted to gain 
some form of strategic or operational advantage.  If cyber warfare is used as an 
enabler in conjunction with other, more traditional forms of warfare, then 
attacking the command and control (C2) networks of an adversary is a likely 
course of action.  To gain the desired effects, a nation must have detailed 
knowledge of their adversary’s military structure—the command relationships, 
force disposition and location, and C2 network.  The role of military intelligence is 
to ensure this information is accurate so the cyber warfare actions are effective 
and the desired strategic or operational advantage is attained. 
The military intelligence node is most heavily influenced by the traits of 
materiel, facilities, sophistication, and support to cyber operations.  In the model, 
when determining how each of the traits influences the military intelligence 
service and its support to the overall cyber warfare capability, the analyst should 
examine the listed considerations. 
• Materiel:  (1) the number of classified networks in the government 
IT infrastructure, (2) evidence of storage for massive amounts of 
collected cyber data and, (3) evidence of power needed to support 
cyber facilities. 
• Facilities:  (1) the number of intelligence bases internationally, (2) 
the midpoint SIGINT capability, (3) the number of classified 
networks in the government IT infrastructure, (4) evidence of 
storage for massive amounts of collected cyber data and, (5) 
evidence of power needed to support cyber facilities. 
• Sophistication:  (1) the acquisition of black market cyber tools, (2) 
the sophistication of the HUMINT program, (3) the midpoint SIGINT 
capability and, (4) the overall intelligence collection capability not 
related to cyber operations. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  (1) the acquisition of black market 
cyber tools, (2) the sophistication of the HUMINT program, (3) the 
midpoint SIGINT capability and, (4) any diplomatic cyber initiatives. 
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5. Cyber Focused Command 
This node represents the presence of a military organization devoted to 
computer network operations (CNO), similar to the United Stated Cyber 
Command (USCYBERCOM), the British Defense Cyber Operations Group 
(COG), or the Israeli Unit 8200.  Although not every country possessing an 
offensive cyber warfare capability has such a military command, the presence is 
a very strong indicator.  It would represent significant investment in time, 
personnel and resources that could only indicate that nation’s belief in the utility 
of developing and maintaining a sustained, offensive cyber warfare capability. 
The cyber focused command node is most heavily influenced by the traits 
of doctrine, organization, materiel, facilities, personnel, sophistication, and 
support to cyber operations.  In the model, when determining how each of the 
traits influences the cyber focused command and its support to the overall cyber 
warfare capability, the analyst should examine the listed considerations. 
• Doctrine:  (1) relationships with other cyber actors, (2) the strength 
of nationalism in the population, (3) sponsorship/participation in 
cyber security conferences, (4) the role that IO plays across the 
spectrum of conflict, (5) the use of offensive CNO to support 
programs outside of strategic IO, (6) any covert cyber activity 
detected, (7) a declaratory response policy, (8) operations against 
domestic opposition websites, (9) any diplomatic cyber initiatives 
and, (10) the overall IW program OPSEC level. 
• Organization:  (1) the presence of an IO range infrastructure, (2) 
open source reorganizations of IO organizations, (3) CNA release 
authority, (4) a clandestine infrastructure for remote operations, (5) 
cyber training programs in the military/intelligence services and, (6) 
technologically savvy individuals serving in senior government 
positions. 
• Materiel:  (1) the presence of an IO range infrastructure, (2) 
observation of traveling government IT technicians servicing IO 
platforms abroad, (3) a clandestine infrastructure for remote 
operations and, (4) the number of classified networks in the 
government IT infrastructure. 
• Facilities:  (1) the presence of an IO range infrastructure, (2) a 
clandestine infrastructure for remote operations, (3) the number of 
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classified networks in the government IT infrastructure and, (4) 
evidence of power needed to support cyber facilities. 
• Personnel:  (1) the strength of nationalism in the population, (2) the 
number of cyber related contracts for bid, (3) the recruiting of 
students to act as cyber operators, (4) observation of traveling 
government IT technicians servicing IO platforms abroad, (5) cyber 
training programs in the military/intelligence services and, (6) 
technologically savvy individuals serving in senior government 
positions. 
• Sophistication:  (1) the acquisition of black market cyber tools, (2) 
the presence of an IO range infrastructure, (3) the use of offensive 
CNO to support programs outside of strategic IO and, (4) any 
documented CNE successes. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  (1) the acquisition of black market 
cyber tools, (2) the size of the hacker community, (3) the presence 
of an IO range infrastructure, (4) sponsorship/participation in cyber 
security conferences, (5) the role that IO plays across the spectrum 
of conflict, (6) any covert cyber activity detected, (7) observation of 
traveling government IT technicians servicing IO platforms abroad, 
(8) any documented CNE successes and, (9) any diplomatic cyber 
initiatives. 
6. Homeland Security Network Defense 
This node represents the presence of a national level agency dedicated to 
the protection of government networks, similar to the United States Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), National Cyber Security Division (NCSD).  
Although not directly involved in offensive cyber warfare, an organization 
dedicated to protecting the nation’s critical network infrastructure should give 
insight into how seriously a nation views cyber warfare.  Also important is the fact 
that to effectively defend your network against attacks, you must first have a 
thorough understanding of the attack tools and methods.  Therefore, effective 
defense means detailed knowledge of attack.  As stated by Dr. Dorothy Denning 
of the NPS, “A country with a strong CND capability would be in a much better 
position to build and use a CNA/E capability than one without” (Denning, 2007). 
The homeland security network defense node is most heavily influenced 
by the traits of doctrine, organization, materiel, personnel, and support to cyber 
 31 
operations.  In the model, when determining how each of the traits influences 
homeland security network defense and its support to the overall cyber warfare 
capability, the analyst should analyze the listed considerations. 
• Doctrine:  (1) relationships with other cyber actors, (2) the 
cybercrime level, (3) relationships with international cyber security 
organizations, (4) sponsorship/participation in cyber security 
conferences, (5) the capability to implement best practices in 
regards to computer security, (6) access to computer security data 
from international organizations (INTERPOL, ITU, etc.), (7) any 
diplomatic cyber initiatives and, (8) the overall IW program OPSEC 
level.  
• Organization:  (1) the presence of an IO range infrastructure, (2) 
open source reorganizations of IO organizations, (3) evidence of an 
Internet monitoring program, (4) a critical infrastructure protection 
program and, (5) technologically savvy individuals serving in senior 
government positions. 
• Materiel:  (1) the presence of an IO range infrastructure, (2) 
observation of traveling government IT technicians servicing IO 
platforms abroad, (3) the capability to implement best practices in 
regards to computer security and, (4) the number of classified 
networks in the government IT infrastructure. 
• Personnel:  (1)  the number of cyber related contracts for bid, (2) 
the recruiting of students to act as cyber operators, (3) observation 
of traveling government IT technicians servicing IO platforms 
abroad and, (4) technologically savvy individuals serving in senior 
government positions. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  (1)  the presence of an IO range 
infrastructure, (2) sponsorship/participation in cyber security 
conferences, (3) observation of traveling government IT technicians 
servicing IO platforms abroad, (4) evidence of an Internet 
monitoring program, (5) any diplomatic cyber initiatives and, (6) the 
overall IW program OPSEC level. 
7. Law Enforcement 
This node represents law enforcement agencies at all levels of 
government that contribute to the enforcement of computer related crimes.  
During the course of investigation of crimes, particularly computer crimes, 
various law enforcement agencies will develop information regarding attack 
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signatures, tactics and potentially the origin of the attack, all of which is useful to 
other departments and agencies, specifically those focused on cyber warfare. 
The law enforcement node is most heavily influenced by the traits of 
doctrine and sophistication.  In the model, when determining how each of the 
traits influences law enforcement and its support to the overall cyber warfare 
capability, the analyst should focus on the listed considerations. 
• Doctrine:  (1) relationships with other cyber actors, (2) the 
cybercrime level, (3) access to computer security data from 
international organizations (INTERPOL, ITU, etc.), (4) operations 
against domestic opposition websites, (5) the level of concern over 
cybercrime, (6) any diplomatic cyber initiatives and, (7) the overall 
IW program OPSEC level. 
• Sophistication:  (1) the sophistication of the HUMINT program, (2) 
the overall intelligence capabilities not related to cyber operations 
and, (3) the capability to remotely delete data from websites or 
computers. 
8. State Control of Private Sector 
This node represents the degree to which the private sector has been 
nationalized or controlled by the state, giving the state control over decisions and 
operations.  Modern computer systems are assembled from components 
manufactured in various locations, not all of which are tightly controlled.  This 
leads to opportunities for executing a supply chain attack, which is when  
…an attacker disrupts the supply chain lifecycle by manipulating 
computer system hardware, software, or services for the purpose of 
espionage, theft of critical data or technology, or to disrupt mission 
critical operations or infrastructure.  Manipulating a technology, 
component, or product, such as USB thumb drive, digital camera, 
or digital projector can provide a direct means for compromising 
targeted organizations with very little risk to the attacker.  
(Stracener, 2010)    
According to the recently released White House Cyberspace Policy 
Review, “The challenge with supply chain attacks is that a sophisticated 
adversary might narrowly focus on particular systems and make manipulation 
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virtually impossible to discover” (Obama, 2011).  By exercising control over the 
private sector, a nation is in position to execute supply chain attacks by 
influencing the manufacturing process or the logistical chain of the components 
used later by potential adversaries. 
The state control of the private sector node is most heavily influenced by 
the traits of doctrine, organization, sophistication, and support to cyber 
operations.  In the model, when determining how each of the traits influences 
state control of the private sector and its support to the overall cyber warfare 
capability, the analyst should examine the listed considerations. 
• Doctrine:  (1) the level of state control of the tech sector, (2) the 
level of state control of the media, (3) the relationships between the 
government/intelligence organizations and the nation’s domestic 
corporations and, (4) the level of regulation of domestic Internet 
service providers (ISPs). 
• Organization:  (1) the level of state control of the tech sector and 
(2) the level of state control of the media. 
• Sophistication:  (1) the level of state control of the tech sector, (2) 
the level of state control of the media and, (3) a supply chain 
program. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  (1) the level of risk to corporations 
that cooperate with the government on cyber operations and (2) a 
supply chain program. 
B. PRIVATE INDUSTRY 
Following government, the next family of nodes is that of the private 
industry.  This node encompasses the research, development and production 
conducted by the nation’s private, or nongovernmental, entities that can be 
leveraged to develop a sustained, offensive cyber warfare capability.  The private 
industry node has four parent nodes, which are: computer security organizations, 
network infrastructure, computer hardware companies, and computer software 
companies (Figure 9).  We reasoned that a very important part of a country being 
able to conduct cyber warfare was whether there were domestic organizations 
dedicated to the research and development of cyber security best practices, and 
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domestic corporations dedicated to the development and production of the 
hardware and software needed to advance the nation’s overall IT capability.  The 
presence of these organizations and corporations should provide an indicator of 
the overall state of cyber maturity.  Another factor was the state of the country’s 
network infrastructure (telephone lines, fiber optic lines, Internet service 
providers, electrical power capacity, etc.).  Having a stable network infrastructure 
is necessary for a cyber warfare capability and the number of the previously 
mentioned security, hardware and software firms should provide the means for 
the network infrastructure to grow to support a sustained, offensive cyber warfare 
capability. 
 
Figure 9.   Private Industry node of the Cyber Warfare Capability Model 
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1. Computer Security Organizations 
Before defining what we mean by computer security organizations, we 
must first define what we mean by computer security itself.  Computer security is 
a subset of information security, which the Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2002 defines as, “protecting information and information 
systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 
destruction in order to provide integrity, confidentiality, and availability.”  With this 
definition in mind, we examined the computer security organizations node as the 
presence of organizations and companies dedicated to the development and 
implementation of best practices for guaranteeing the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of the information resident on and transiting computer networks.  
Included in this node would be traditional anti-virus, computer security companies 
(i.e., Kapersky Lab and Symantec), not-for-profit computer security organizations 
(i.e., Team Cymru and the Center for Internet Security), and university affiliated 
research groups (i.e., Carnegie Mellon’s CyLab and Dartmouth College’s Institute 
for Security Technology Studies).  This node is designed to encompass the 
research efforts a country is employing to secure their networks. 
The computer security organizations node is most heavily influenced by 
the traits of training and education, financing, research and development, 
sophistication, and support to cyber operations.  In the model, when determining 
how each of the traits influences computer security organizations and their 
support to the overall cyber warfare capability, the analyst should analyze the 
listed considerations. 
• Training and Education:  (1) relationships with international cyber 
security organizations, (2) the number of students graduating from 
cyber security education programs, (3) the number of published 
articles on cyber security in academic/professional publications 
and, (4) sponsorship/participation in cyber security conferences. 
• Financing:  (1) the level of state control of the tech sector, (2) 
gross domestic product (GDP), (3) CND investment and, (4) the 
relationships between the government/intelligence organizations 
and the nation’s domestic corporations. 
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• Research and Development:  (1) the level of state control of the 
tech sector, (2) sponsorship/participation in cyber security 
conferences, (3)  cyber dedicated facilities, (4) the number of 
computer security patents, (5) the relationships between the 
government/intelligence organizations and the nation’s domestic 
corporations, (6) the capability to implement best practices in 
regards to computer security and, (7) an information security tool 
development program. 
• Sophistication:  (1) virus proliferation (this would indicate a 
negative correlation), (2) relationships with international cyber 
security organizations, (3) the number of published articles on 
cyber security in academic/professional publications, (4) the 
number of computer security patents, (5) the capability to 
implement best practices in regards to computer security and, (6) 
an information security tool development program. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  (1) virus proliferation (this would 
indicate a negative correlation), (2) the number of students 
graduation from cyber security education programs, (3) the number 
of computer security patents and, (4) the relationships between the 
government/intelligence organizations and the nation’s domestic 
corporations. 
2. Network Infrastructure 
This node represents the capacity of a nation to support the flow of 
information through the physical hardware used to interconnect computers and 
users, and includes the transmission media and electrical power capacity.  The 
measures considered in this node represent the whole of a country’s information 
and communications technology capacity.  An analyst should consider this node 
in a similar fashion as INSEAD and the World Economic Forum considered the 
overall networked readiness index (NRI) in the annual the Global Information 
Technology Report (Dutta & Mia, 2010).  In particular, as part of their 
environment sub-index, Dutta and Mia considered the infrastructure environment, 
which was broken down into nine categories, such as the number of telephone 




of the nine factors are measurable with hard data and widely accessible making 
an evaluation of the network infrastructure node for the model fairly 
straightforward. 
The network infrastructure node is most heavily influenced by the traits of 
materiel and facilities.  In the model, when determining how each of the traits 
influences the network infrastructure and its support to the overall cyber warfare 
capability, the analyst should analyze the listed considerations. 
• Materiel:  (1) the cybercrime level, (2) the scope of the network 
infrastructure and, (3) the offshoring of computer services (this 
would indicate a negative correlation). 
• Facilities:  (1) the scope of the network infrastructure, (2) the 
offshoring of computer services (this would indicate a negative 
correlation) and, (3) evidence of power needed to support cyber 
facilities. 
3. Computer Hardware Companies 
This node represents the nation’s domestic corporations that are 
dedicated to developing the physical components of the computer systems 
involved in the performance of data processing or communications functions.  
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) defines hardware as, 
“physical equipment used to process, store, or transmit computer programs or 
data” (IEEE, 1990).  These physical components could include processors, 
memory storage (both hard disk and random access), input devices (keyboards 
and mice), output devices (displays and monitors), as well as other peripherals 
(printers, modems, servers, etc.).  It is on the hardware that the various 
applications or programs, known as software, are installed and executed.  A 
nation that has a large number of companies devoted to the development and 
production of computer hardware would have an advantage over the nations that 
do not when developing a national network infrastructure. 
The computer hardware companies node is most heavily influenced by the 
traits of materiel, facilities, research and development, and sophistication.  In the 
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model, when determining how each of the traits influences computer hardware 
companies and their support to the overall cyber warfare capability, the analyst 
should analyze the listed considerations. 
• Materiel:  (1) the number of computers per person, (2) the number 
of cyber dedicated facilities, (3) the covert communications 
capability and, (4) the dependence on the Internet for 
communications. 
• Facilities:  (1) the number of cyber dedicated facilities, (2) the 
covert communications capability, (3) the number of domestic ISPs 
and, (4) the ability to produce high tech, noncyber military 
equipment. 
• Research and Development:  (1) the level of state control of the 
tech sector, (2) the number of cyber related facilities, (3) the 
relationships between the government/intelligence organizations 
and the nation’s domestic corporations and, (4) the ability to 
produce high tech, noncyber related military equipment. 
• Sophistication:  (1) virus proliferation (this would indicate a 
negative correlation), (2) the relationships with international cyber 
security organizations, (3) the covert communications capability, (4) 
the national connectivity to the global IT infrastructure and, (5) the 
ability to produce high tech, noncyber military equipment. 
4. Computer Software Companies 
This node represents the nation’s domestic corporations that are 
dedicated to developing and implementing the applications, drivers, middle-ware, 
test-ware, programming tools and operating system software that run on the 
computers, networks and communications systems.  The IEEE defines software 
as “computer programs, procedures, and possibly associated documentation and 
data pertaining to the operation of a computer system” (IEEE, 1990).  It is the 
software that controls what the computer executes and provides an interface 
between the computer system hardware and the user—either human or 
automated.  As in the computer hardware companies node, a nation with a large 
number of companies devoted to the development and implementation of 
computer software would have a distinct advantage over the countries that do not 
when developing a national network infrastructure. 
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The computer software companies node is most heavily influenced by the 
traits of materiel, research and development, and sophistication.  In the model, 
when determining how each of the traits influences computer software 
companies and their support to the overall cyber warfare capability, the analyst 
should examine the listed considerations. 
• Materiel:  (1) the number of computers per person, (2) the number 
of cyber dedicated facilities, (3) the covert communications 
capability and, (4) the ability to produce high tech, noncyber military 
equipment. 
• Research and Development:  (1) the level of state control of the 
tech sector, (2) the relationships between the 
government/intelligence organizations and the nation’s domestic 
corporations, (3) an information security tool development program 
and, (4) the ability to produce high tech, noncyber military 
equipment. 
• Sophistication:  (1) virus proliferation (this would indicate a 
negative correlation), (2) relationships with international cyber 
security organizations, (3) the covert communications capability, (4) 
an information security tool development program and, (5) the 
ability to produce high tech, noncyber military equipment. 
C. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
The next family of nodes is that of science and technology, which 
considers the state of maturity of a nation’s capability in a few highly technical 
scientific fields, as well as the level of commitment and funding for overall 
scientific research.  The science and technology node has five parent nodes: 
cryptographic capability, forensic capability, reverse engineering capability, 
national research laboratories, and other scientific communities (Figure 10).  We 
considered a nation’s capabilities in cryptography, computer forensics, and the 
reverse engineering of electronics as very strong indicators of an overall 
capability to develop a sustained, offensive cyber warfare program.  
Cryptography is important for both CNA/E and CND, while computer forensics 
and reverse engineering require an advanced understanding of computer 
engineering.  These together provide a solid foundation for a country to project a 
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cyber warfare capability.  Also important is the level of commitment the 
government gives to the research in these and related areas.  We considered the 
U.S. National Laboratory System as a good exemplar.  If a country has the ability 
to bring together the leading scientists in various fields to work together on 
cutting edge research, then that country could potentially develop the necessary 
skill sets to field a cyber warfare capability.  Another aspect we considered 
important was the state of maturity in a country’s other advanced scientific 
communities.  A country that has advanced scientifically in disciplines other than 
cyber is much more likely to be able to develop a sustained, offensive cyber 
warfare capability than those nations that are not. 
 
Figure 10.   Science and Technology node of the Cyber Warfare Capability 
Model 
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1. Cryptographic Capability 
This node represents the level at which a country can perform 
cryptographic and cryptanalytic functions, which can be an indicator of overall IT 
capability and maturity.  Employment of cryptographic functions can be for both 
defensive and offensive purposes.  Defensively, encryption helps safeguard the 
information resident on particular hosts and data in transit across a network.  As 
long as the secret keys are kept secret, then the data should be secure from 
unauthorized access.  It also important to note that, as stated earlier, there is a 
strong relationship between a nation’s knowledge of how to defend its networks 
and being able to translate that information into an offensive attack or exploitation 
capability (Denning, 2007).  Offensively, attackers can use cryptanalysis to break 
the encryption of targeted networks.  Additionally, attackers can use encryption to 
prevent their malicious code from being identified, both during installation and 
once resident on the targeted computer.  One recent example is the W32.Stuxnet 
worm that as of September 2010 had infected approximately 100,000 computers 
worldwide, with the highest concentration in Iran.  The creators of Stuxnet made 
extensive use of encryption, particularly of the .dll files, in order to bypass 
security mechanisms on the targeted computers.  Also encrypted was the data 
Stuxnet sent back to the dedicated, remote command and control servers 
(Falliere, Murchu & Chien, 2010).  An advanced cryptographic capability 
indicates access to and understanding of advanced computer hardware and 
software and can be an indicator of a country’s cyber warfare capability. 
The cryptographic capability node is most heavily influenced by the traits 
of materiel, research and development, sophistication, and support to cyber 
operations.  In the model, when determining how each of the traits influences the 
cryptographic capability and its support to the overall cyber warfare capability, 
the analyst should analyze the listed considerations. 
• Materiel:  (1) the presence of a quantum cryptography program, (2) 
cyber dedicated facilities, (3) the level of botnet activity and, (4) a 
ranking in the top 100 of the world’s fastest computers. 
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• Research and Development:  (1) cyber dedicated facilities, (2) the 
presence of Silicon Valley-like high tech corridors, (3) the number 
of computer security patents, (4) the capability to steal technology 
and make use of it outside of cyber operations, (5) the relationships 
between the government/intelligence organizations and the nation’s 
domestic corporations, (6) an information security tool development 
program, and (7) a CNA tool development program. 
• Sophistication:  (1) the presence of a quantum cryptography 
program, (2) relationships with international cyber security 
organizations, (3) the midpoint SIGINT capability, (4) the presence 
of Silicon Valley-like high tech corridors, (5) the number of 
computer security patents, (6) the role that IO plays across the 
spectrum of conflict, (7) the use of steganography, (8) the capability 
to steal technology and make use of it outside of cyber operations, 
(9) the level of botnet activity, (10) the capability to implement best 
practices in regards to computer security, (11) an information 
security tool development program, and (12) a CNA  tool 
development program. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  (1) the midpoint SIGINT capability, 
(2) the presence of Silicon Valley-like high tech corridors, (3) the 
role that IO plays across the spectrum of conflict, (4) a ranking in 
the top 100 of the world’s fastest computers and, a CNA tool 
development program. 
2. Forensic Capability 
This node represents the level at which a nation can perform computer 
forensics, which is a strong indicator of an advanced IT capability.  As defined by 
the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), computer 
forensics is: 
The discipline that combines elements of law and computer science 
to collect and analyze data from computer systems, networks, 
wireless communications, and storage devices in a way that is 
admissible as evidence in a court of law. (2008)  
Being capable of conducting computer forensics provides the advantage of 
learning specifics about an attacker’s methods (tools used, vulnerabilities 
exploited, data lost, etc.).  In his report to the U.S.–China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, Bryan Krekel detailed how, using forensic techniques, a 
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U.S. commercial firm was able to re-create an attack scenario that cost the firm 
large amounts of data (exactly how much still is not known) (2009).  Through 
forensics, the firm’s information security staff was able to determine that only 
specific items of data were exfiltrated, indicating the attackers were working from 
a specific set of collection requirements.  The attackers worked in two distinct 
teams each employing different toolsets: one team for the breach of the network 
and one team for the collection and exfiltration of the data.  The staff determined 
the specifics on how the exfiltration took place, even to the point of finding that 
the collected data was compressed into 650MB files (the maximum capacity of a 
standard CD-ROM) prior to exfiltration.  Most importantly was that although the 
firm could not definitively ascertain the identity of the attackers, forensics allowed 
the staff to identify specific keyboard presences.  This refers to the specific habits 
an attacker develops over the course of performing the same functions many 
times.  The sophistication, frequency, combination of commands, and elapsed 
time between keyboard entries all contribute to defining an individual forensic 
profile for an attacker.  Comparing their forensic profiles to those seen in the 
past, the staff determined this case was consistent with previous intrusions into 
U.S. networks by Chinese attackers (Krekel, 2009).  An advanced computer 
forensics capability indicates well-developed knowledge of computer engineering 
and networks that could readily be applied to the development of a sustained, 
offensive cyber warfare capability. 
The forensic capability node is most heavily influenced by the traits of 
research and development, sophistication, and support to cyber operations.  In 
the model, when determining how each of the traits influences the forensic 
capability and its support to the overall cyber warfare capability, the analyst 
should examine the listed considerations. 
• Research and Development:  (1) the acquisition of black market 
cyber tools, (2) cyber dedicated facilities, (3) the capability to steal 
technology and make use of outside of cyber operations, (4) the 
relationships between the government/intelligence organizations 
and the nation’s domestic corporations and, (5) a CNA tool 
development program. 
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• Sophistication:  (1) the acquisition of black market cyber tools, (2) 
the relationships with international cyber security organizations, (3) 
the presence of Silicon Valley-like high tech corridors, (4) the role 
that IO plays across the spectrum of conflict, (5) the capability to 
steal technology and make use of it outside of cyber operations, 
and (6) a CNA tool development program. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  (1) the acquisition of black market 
cyber tools, (2) the presence of Silicon Valley-like high tech 
corridors, (3) the role that IO plays across the spectrum of conflict 
and, (4) a CNA tool development program. 
3. Reverse Engineering Capability 
This node represents the level at which a country can perform reverse 
engineering, which is a strong indicator of an advance IT capability.  The 
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines reverse engineering as disassembling and 
examining or analyzing in detail to discover the concepts involved in manufacture 
in order to produce something similar (“reverse engineering,” n.d.).  The term 
also applies to intangible concepts as well, most notably for the model, to 
software and strings of malware.  A country that has the technological know-how 
to examine in detail the source code of a string of malware used as an exploit 
has a significant advantage when it comes to engineering their own methods of 
attack.  This reverse engineering capability goes beyond being able to read and 
implement the results of reverse engineering from the commercial computer 
security companies and laboratories.  Here, the capability refers to whether a 
particular country has the capability to conduct this type of analysis in-house 
without relying on others to do it for them.  Possessing an advanced reverse 
engineering capability for software and strings of malware indicates the capacity 
to develop cyber related exploits for use in a cyber warfare program. 
The reverse engineering capability node is most heavily influenced by the 
traits of research and development, sophistication, and support to cyber 
operations.  In the model, when determining how each of the traits influences the 
reverse engineering capability and its support to the overall cyber warfare 
capability, the analyst should examine the listed considerations. 
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• Research and Development:  (1)  the acquisition of black market 
cyber tools, (2) the sophistication of the HUMINT program, (3) 
cyber dedicated facilities, (4) the capability to steal technology and 
make use of it outside of cyber operations, (5) the relationships 
between the government/intelligence organizations and the nation’s 
domestic corporations, (6) an information security tool development 
program and, (7) a CNA tool development program. 
• Sophistication:  (1) the acquisition of black market cyber tools, (2) 
the presence of Silicon Valley-like high tech corridors, (3) the role 
that IO plays across the spectrum of conflict, (4) the capability to 
steal technology and make use of it outside of cyber operations, (5) 
the capability to implement best practices in regards to computer 
security, (6) an information security tool development program and, 
(7) a CNA tool development program. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  (1) the acquisition of black market 
cyber tools, (2) the presence of Silicon Valley-like high tech 
corridors, (3) the role that IO plays across the spectrum of conflict 
and, (4) a CNA tool development program. 
4. National Research Laboratories 
This node represents the presence of government funded and run 
research laboratories, which can indicate the level of commitment and funding 
necessary to develop a cyber warfare capability.  As a model, we used the 
United States Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratory System, 
encompassing 21 national laboratories and technology centers.  Even though 
they are sponsored by the DOE, these laboratories and technology centers 
conduct cutting edge research on a variety of scientific and technological topics, 
including computer science.  For example, the mission of the Computer Science 
and Mathematics Division at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory includes: 
Working on important national priorities with advanced computing 
systems, working cooperatively with U.S. Industry to enable 
efficient, cost-competitive design, and working with universities to 
enhance science education and scientific awareness. Our 
researchers are finding new ways to solve problems beyond the 
reach of most computers and are putting powerful software tools 
into the hands of students, teachers, government researchers, and 
industrial scientists. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 2011) 
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Another example is Sandia National Laboratory’s Science, Technology, 
and Engineering (ST&E) Mission Area, which includes investment in six research 
foundations, one of which is computers and information science.  The ST&E 
mission is to create: 
Innovative, science-based, systems-engineering solutions to our 
Nation's most challenging national security problems.  Sandia's 
guiding principals [sic] for ST&E ensure that the fundamental 
science and engineering core is vibrant and pushing the forefront of 
knowledge. Enabling our programs by effective application of that 
science base allows us to respond to current needs as well as 
anticipate the future. (Sandia National Laboratories, 2011) 
The ability of a nation to bring together the leading scientists in particular 
fields and fund their research on state-of-the-art technologies is a strong indicator 
of the overall funding and commitment necessary to develop a sustained, 
offensive cyber warfare capability if they choose to do so. 
The national research laboratories node is most heavily influenced by the 
traits of research and development, sophistication, and support to cyber 
operations.  In the model, when determining how each of the traits influences the 
national research laboratories and their support to the overall cyber warfare 
capability, the analyst should analyze the listed considerations. 
• Research and Development:  (1) the midpoint SIGINT capability, 
(2) the number of computer security patents, (3) the capability to 
steal technology and make use of it outside of cyber operations, (4) 
an information security tool development program and, (5) a CNA 
tool development program. 
• Sophistication:  (1) the number of computer security patents, (2) 
the role that IO plays across the spectrum of conflict, (3) the 
capability to steal technology and make use of it outside of cyber 
operations, (4) an information security tool development program 
and, (5) a CNA tool development program. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  (1) the midpoint SIGINT capability, 
(2) the number of computer security patents, (3) the role that IO 
plays across the spectrum of conflict and, (4) a CNA tool 
development program. 
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5. Other Scientific Communities 
This node represents the presence and maturity of other scientific 
communities (space or nuclear, etc.).  While not directly related to a cyber 
capability, technical maturity in other advanced scientific communities can 
indicate that the country had the requisite general scientific knowledge to develop 
a cyber warfare capability. 
The other scientific communities node is most heavily influenced by the 
trait sophistication.  In the model, when determining how each of the traits 
influences the other scientific communities and their support to the overall cyber 
warfare capability, the analyst should analyze the following considerations:  (1) 
satellite programs, (2) nuclear programs and, (3) the ability to produce high tech, 
noncyber related military equipment. 
D. ACADEMICS AND RESEARCH 
The final node family is that of academics and research.  This node 
focuses on the resources (skilled manpower) that a nation can draw upon, rather 
than the institutions themselves.  Educational institutions and professional 
organizations facilitate the development of a strong academic and research 
community.  The Academics and Research Node represents the ability of a 
nation to educate a force of IT professionals to fill roles in the government and 
private sector and how well connected the educated IT professional are in the 
international cyber related community.  This node is composed of two parent 
nodes, which are an educated force and affiliation with professional organizations 
(Figure 11).  The intent here was to create a separate category from the research 
being conducted by the private sector (as analyzed in the private sector node 
family) with the emphasis primarily on the academic aspect.  We saw the most 
important factor here being the educated force, not just those already educated 
and working in a cyber related field, but also those being educated in cyber and 
representing the next generation of cyber operators.  Also considered was the 
degree to which a county’s IT professionals affiliate with professional cyber 
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related organizations.  A large number of affiliations would indicate that country’s 
professionals are respected and have access to the current international 
research and development efforts that can be leveraged in their own cyber 
education programs. 
 
Figure 11.   Academics and Research node of the Cyber Warfare Capability 
Model 
1. Educated Force 
This node represents the number of people who are educated in the 
disciplines of computer science/security/engineering.  An educated force would 
consist of individuals working in a variety of environments, including government, 
the private sector, and academia.  Those working in government could be 
applied directly to the cyber warfare mission, while those working in the private 
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sector could be involved in the research and development aspect of a cyber 
warfare mission.  Perhaps more importantly, would be those working in 
academia, educating a steady stream of cyber-capable graduates who go on to 
work in either the government or private sectors.  It is these graduates and 
working IT professionals who make possible the cryptographic, forensic, and 
reverse engineering capabilities, as well as being directly employed as cyber 
operators for the state.  A country with large numbers of educated IT 
professionals has a large pool from which to draw in order to develop and sustain 
a cyber warfare capability. 
The educated force node is most heavily influenced by the traits of training 
and education, personnel, and sophistication.  In the model, when determining 
how each of the traits influences the educated force and its support to the overall 
cyber warfare capability, the analyst should examine the listed considerations. 
• Training and Education:  (1) linguistic capability, (2) the number of 
computer security students studying abroad, (3) GDP, (4) the 
number of cyber based research publications, (5) the number of 
students graduating from cyber security education programs, (6) 
the number of published articles on cyber security in 
academic/professional publications, (7) the recruiting of students to 
act as cyber operators, (8) the pervasiveness of computer 
science/computer engineering programs and, (9) the offshoring of 
computer services (this would indicate a negative correlation). 
• Personnel:  (1) the number of students graduating from cyber 
security education programs, (2) the number of cyber related 
contracts for bid and, (3) the offshoring of computer services (this 
would indicate a negative correlation). 
• Sophistication:  (1) the presence of a quantum cryptography 
program, (2) the number of cyber based research publications, (3) 
the number of computers per person, (4) the technological 
sophistication of the population, (5) the number of computer 
security patents and, (6) the use of steganography. 
2. Affiliation with Professional Organizations 
A country with large numbers of IT professionals who are affiliated with 
accredited, professional cyber-related organizations (ACM, IEEE, ISSA, etc.) can 
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draw from a pool of people who are educated, professional, networked, and are 
familiar with the state-of-the-art and best practices of cyber-related disciplines.  
While not necessarily a direct indication of a cyber warfare capability, the number 
of IT professionals affiliated with respected cyber-related organizations can 
provide an indication of the state of a country’s IT sector maturity.  Affiliation with 
these organizations allows access to up-to-date technological information on 
computer and communication systems from both an engineering (hardware, 
software, and systems engineering) and operational (computer network attack 
and defense) perspective.  A potentially strong indication of the IT sector maturity 
is how often researchers from a particular country publish articles in scholarly 
journals and other periodicals associated with these professional organizations. 
The affiliation with professional organizations node is most heavily 
influenced by the traits of training and education, sophistication, and support to 
cyber operations.  In the model, when determining how each of the traits 
influences the affiliation with professional organizations and its support to the 
overall cyber warfare capability, the analyst should analyze the listed 
considerations. 
• Training and Education:  (1) the number of memberships in IT 
related groups (i.e., IEEE, ACM, ISSA), (2) the number of cyber 
related research publications and, (3) sponsorship/participation in 
cyber security conferences. 
• Sophistication:  (1) the number of memberships in IT related 
groups (i.e., IEEE, ACM, ISSA), (2) the relationships with 
international cyber security organizations, (3) 
sponsorship/participation in cyber security conferences and, (4) 
diplomatic cyber initiatives. 
• Support to Cyber Operations:  (1) the number of memberships in 
IT related groups (i.e., IEEE, ACM, ISSA), (2) the number of cyber 
based research publications, (3) the relationships with international 
cyber security organizations and, (4) access to computer security 
data from international organizations (INTERPOL, ITU, etc.). 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Thesis conclusions are articulated, followed by key recommendations that 
could improve the SIAM Cyber Warfare Capability Model. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis explored a new approach to examining whether a country 
possesses a sustained, offensive cyber warfare capability.  In doing so, we 
attempted to identify a process to quantify the baseline information needed to 
model a complex problem allowing analysts to understand the reasoning behind 
the assessments made by the model.  The SIAM Cyber Warfare Capability 
Model is meant to be used as a mechanism to examine in detail the factors that 
should indicate a country’s cyber warfare capabilities. 
The culmination of our work, the Cyber Warfare Capability Model, was 
delivered to the sponsor, who then shared the model with other agencies 
involved with identifying, analyzing, and tracking countries that possess a 
sustained, offensive cyber warfare capability.  The sponsor said the modified 
DOTMLPF Analysis in our model provided a solid foundation for future modeling 
efforts. 
The sponsor’s vision for the model had changed from the requirements 
laid out for our initial effort.  The sponsor initially envisioned assessing whether a 
country has the capability to conduct sustained, offensive cyber warfare using a 
strictly resources-based approach.  The sponsor expressed that the modified 
DOTMLPF Analysis employed in the Cyber Warfare Capability Model did an 
excellent job of accounting for a resources methodology.  However, the sponsor 
decided to look at the problem from a different perspective within a framework 
that connected the different offensive cyber missions with different operations in 
addition to resources.  The sponsor built a model in SIAM, the State Offensive 
Cyber Program  Capabilities Model, taking a capability equals sophistication 
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times resources approach.  The sponsor used our model and methodology to 
account for resources and inform the various intelligence services.  We felt that 
the incorporation of our model and methodology into the State Offensive Cyber 
Program Model was validation for our work and the approach employed. 
We used a systems engineering approach, incorporating a modified 
DOTMLPF Analysis, to view a country’s cyber warfare capability.  The top-down 
approach allowed us to transform the sponsor’s initial requirements into a viable 
solution.  The sponsor said the systematic process employed in our model 
accounted for a resource based approach and met the design goals initially laid 
out.  The Cyber Warfare Capability Model is a novel approach and hopefully will 
provide a launching point to start understanding state offensive cyber programs. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The model presented in this thesis met the initial expectations, as it does 
an excellent job of accounting for a resource-based approach to assess the 
sustained, offensive cyber warfare capabilities of a country.  However, certain 
aspects should be taken into consideration for future research and validation of 
the model. 
1. Complexity 
SIAM is designed to assess very complex issues.  However, one must 
remember the user in the process of designing a model.  If the model becomes 
too complex, the user may not be able to gain any benefit from it.  We felt that 
the current model did a fairly good job of keeping thoughts organized in a 
hierarchal manner, despite the 15,010 (190 traits x 79 considerations) 
evaluations required to develop the model.  In our opinion, once our model was 
combined into the State Offensive Cyber Program Model, it lost the simplistic 
hierarchal approach.  It was not necessarily self-apparent which nodes were the 
Initial Nodes, requiring user input.  This is something that can be remedied, but 
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must be kept in mind when creating a user-friendly model.  The analysts’ ability 
to use the model as a tool is the ultimate litmus test. 
During the development of the model, we constrained ourselves to work 
within the data given to us by the sponsor (object, traits, and considerations).  
We think this limitation was beneficial for the initial development as it limited the 
scope of our thinking and research.  It also allowed us to focus on building a 
hierarchical model where the inputs required by the analyst were apparent.  
However, after going through the process of developing and analyzing our 
completed model, we have come to the conclusion that the model could be 
greatly simplified, while still maintaining the same functionality.  While the 
modified DOTMLPF Analysis provided an excellent framework for thinking about 
state sponsored cyber programs, it also proved to be quite redundant.  We 
believe the model does a very good job of accounting for the problem, but may 
be overly complex.  In order to facilitate a more user friendly model, we have 
identified a few suggestions for consideration by the sponsor. 
First, within the government node family, we would suggest combining the 
four separate intelligence services nodes (domestic, foreign, signals, and 
military) into a single node.  While it was useful for us to view these intelligence 
services individually, it created a large amount of redundancy when analyzing the 
considerations that inform the traits for each intelligence service.  For a more 
user friendly model, these could be combined into a single node representing the 
country’s overall intelligence capability so that the analyst would only need to 
examine intelligence once.  Doing this would decrease the number of 
intelligence-related traits that need input from the analyst by 75%. 
The second suggestion is to combine the two node families of private 
sector with academics and research into a single node family that would 
encompass the research and development efforts by a country.  While our model 
accounts for the research and development in two separate sectors, it is hard to 
separate the research communities since the researchers in both attend the 
same conferences and often publish in the same places.  In fact, people in 
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academia and industry coauthor many papers and many PHDs go into the 
private sector where they continue their research.  In retrospect, there may be 
very little value added from analyzing this with two distinct node families. 
Our third suggestion is to redefine the trait categories we used for our 
modified DOTMLPF analysis.  In our model, we used ten categories of traits, but 
these could be simplified by combining the ten traits into four broader categories.  
For example, our traits of organization, training and education, and personnel 
and manpower could be combined into a single trait of personnel used by the 
analyst to consider the information previously needed to inform the three traits.  
Additionally, our traits of materiel, financing, and facilities could be combined into 
a single trait for resources that would encompass the three previously used traits.  
Finally, we used the traits of sophistication and support to cyber operations, but 
these really just speak directly to a country’s capabilities.  For simplicity, these 
two traits could be combined into a single trait called capabilities and would retain 
the same functionality.  By redefining the categories of traits and simplifying them 
from ten to four, this would save the analyst 60% of effort across the entire model 
and would significantly reduce redundancy as well. 
Our final recommendation would be to reevaluate the list of considerations 
used to inform the traits discussed above.  The considerations used in the model 
were an attempt to capture the direct and indirect influences.  Each 
consideration’s applicability was deliberated for each trait of the modified 
DOTMLPF analysis.  The resulting model included indirect influences to the 
traits, which may themselves have a minimal impact on the objects they are 
informing.  The consequence of this is an unnecessarily complicated model that 
could waste valuable resources and man-hours.  The model was conceived in a 
systemized manner, but this led to many tangible, quantifiable indicators to be 
accounted for multiple times in an abstract fashion.  We think the model would 
benefit greatly from disregarding the list of considerations altogether.  Instead, 
since the traits are the nodes that require user input, the user can define his or 
her own set of considerations on a trait-by-trait basis.  By eliminating the 
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constraint of having to pick from a list of predefined considerations, the analyst 
can eliminate much of the redundancy and ultimately provide a much higher level 
of fidelity for the overall model. 
2. Future Research 
Any modeling tool is only as good as the data provided to the model by 
the user.  While our final recommendation above is to get rid of the constrained 
list of original considerations, we still feel that having a list of things an analyst 
could consider would be helpful, thus subject matter expert input would greatly 
benefit this process.  A survey to garner expert opinions to compile a general list 
of considerations for each trait (policy, personnel, resources, and capabilities) 
could facilitate this.  The purpose of the survey would not be to design the list of 
considerations that an analyst must use, but instead, provide a listing of potential 
items of interest that the user could consider to help stimulate thought.  From 
this, the user could define which particular considerations to use based on how 
he or she sees the situation.  The ultimate goal is to provide analysts a tool that 
helps baseline a country’s cyber warfare capabilities. 
While the methodology was endorsed and incorporated by the sponsor 
into another, larger, model, the Cyber Warfare Capability Model should go 
through extensive test scenarios to evaluate the true functionality.  Test cases to 
ensure the results are consistent with the expected results, using disparate 
examples, would further validate this methodology.  Analysis of these test cases 
could also identify pressure points, applicable across the entire spectrum of 
countries, and help focus limited resources when modeling is not applicable.  
This model or even a modified version of it needs to be tested to explore its full 
potential. 
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APPENDIX A  
LIST OF 79 POTENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1 Number of Intelligence bases Internationally 
2 Level of State control of the Tech sector 
3 Membership in IT (IEEE) like groups 
4 Acquisition of black market tools 
5 Satellite programs 
6 Relationships with other cyber actors 
7 Linguistic capabilities 
8 Size of the hacker community 
9 Nuclear capabilities 
10 Quantum Crypto program 
11 Sophistication of HUMINT program 
12 Number of Computer Security Students studying abroad 
13 IO Range infrastructure 
14 Virus proliferation 
15 Strength of Nationalism in population 
16 Cyber crime level 
17 Level of control of State/private media 
18 GDP 
19 Cyber based research publications 
20 Relationships with international cyber security organizations 
21 Number of students graduating from Cyber Security Education programs 
22 Number of publications on cyber security in academic publications 
23 Midpoint signals intelligence capabilities 
24 Sponsorship/participation of cyber security conferences 
25 Military spending 
26 Network infrastructure 
27 Number of computers/person 
28 Technological sophistication of the population 
29 Cyber dedicated facilities 
30 Silicon Valley like high tech corridors 
31 Intelligence budget 
32 Number of computer security patents 
33 Number of cyber related contracts for bid (green badgers) 
34 Recruiting of students to act as cyber operators 
35 Role that IO plays  across the spectrum of conflict 
36 
Use of offensive computer operations to support programs outside of strategic 
IW 
37 Use of steganography 
38 Covert communications capabilities 
39 Capability to "steal" technology and make use of it outside of cyber operations 
40 Botnet activity 
41 CND investment 
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42 Pervasiveness of computer science /engineering programs 
43 Relationships between government/intelligence organizations and the nation's 
domestic corporations 
44 Open source reorganizations of IO organizations 
45 National connectivity to global IT infrastructure 
46 Covert cyber activity detected 
47 Number of domestic ISPs 
48 Observation of traveling Govt IT techs servicing IO platforms abroad 
49 Overall Intelligence collection capabilities not related to cyber operations 
50 Capability to remotely delete data from websites/computers 
51 CNA release authority 
52 Capability to implement best practices in regard to computer security 
53 Capability to create and run front companies 
54 Clandestine infrastructure for remote operations 
55 Number of classified networks in Govt IT 
56 Declaratory response policy 
57 Network mapping program 
58 CNE success 
59 Dependence on  for communications 
60 Offshoring of computer services (negative correlation) 
61 Evidence of storage for massive amount of collected cyber data 
62 Evidence of power needed to support cyber facilities 
63 Evidence of Internet monitoring program 
64 Level of regulation of domestic  ISPs 
65 Critical infrastructure protection program 
66 Info sec tool development 
67 Ranking in top 100 of world's fastest computers 
68 
access to computer security data from international organizations (Interpol, 
ITU, etc.) 
69 Ability to produce high tech noncyber military equipment 
70 Operations against domestic opposition websites 
71 Risk to corporations that cooperate with Govt on Cyber operations 
72 Level of concern over cyber crime 
73 Cyber training programs in military/intel services 
74 Tech savvy individuals serving in senior Govt positions 
75 Diplomatic cyber initiatives 
76 IW program OPSEC level 
77 Tool development program 
78 Supply chain program 








MAPPING CONSIDERATIONS TO NODES 
Nodes 1.1 1.2 
 
Domestic Intel Service Foreign Intel Service 
Doctrine, Policy, Legal 2, 43, 70, 72, 76 6, 15, 43, 46, 75, 76 
Organization 73, 74 51, 54, 73, 74 
Training and Education 73 73 
Materials  38, 55 38, 48, 54, 55, 61 
Financing 31 31 
Facilities 23, 38, 53, 55 1, 23, 38, 54, 55, 61 
Personnel/Manpower 33, 74 7, 8, 15, 33, 48, 74 
Research and Development 4, 39, 43 4, 39, 43 
Sophistication 4, 11, 23, 38, 39, 49, 50 4, 11, 23, 38, 39, 49, 
50, 58, 79 
Support to Cyber 
Operations 
4, 23, 43, 50 4, 8, 11, 23, 43, 46, 
48, 50, 58, 75, 79 
   Nodes 1.3 1.4 
 
Signals Intel Service Military Intel Service 
Doctrine, Policy, Legal 2, 6, 35, 36, 43, 46, 70, 
75, 76 
76 
Organization 13, 51, 54, 63, 73, 74 73, 74 
Training and Education 13, 73 73 
Materials  13, 38, 40, 48, 54, 55, 61, 
67 
55, 61, 62 
Financing 22, 25, 31 25, 31 
Facilities 1, 13, 23, 28, 38, 54, 55, 
61 
1, 23, 55, 61, 62 
Personnel/Manpower 33, 48, 74 7, 33, 74 
Research and Development 4, 13, 39, 43 4 
Sophistication 4, 13, 23, 30, 36, 38, 39, 
49, 50, 58, 79 
4, 11, 23, 49 
Support to Cyber 
Operations 
4, 13, 23, 30, 35, 43, 46, 
48, 50, 57, 58, 63, 67, 75, 
79 
4, 11, 23, 75 
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Doctrine, Policy, Legal 6, 15, 24, 35, 36, 46, 56, 
70, 75, 76 
6, 16, 20, 24, 52, 68, 
75, 76 
Organization 13, 44, 51, 54, 73, 74 13, 44, 63, 65, 74 
Training and Education 13, 24, 73 13, 22, 24 
Materials  13, 48, 54, 55 13, 48, 52, 55 
Financing 25, 31, 41 31, 25, 41 
Facilities 13, 28, 54, 55, 62 13, 28, 55, 62 
Personnel/Manpower 15, 33, 34, 48, 73, 74 33, 34, 48, 74 
Research and Development 4, 13 13, 41 
Sophistication 4, 13, 36, 58 13, 14, 52 
Support to Cyber 
Operations 
4, 8, 13, 24, 35, 46, 48, 
58, 75 
13, 24, 48, 63, 75, 76 
   Nodes 1.7 1.8 
 
Law Enforcement 
State Ctrl. Priv. 
Sector 
Doctrine, Policy, Legal 6, 16, 68, 70, 72, 75, 76 2, 43, 64 
Organization 74 2, 17 
Training and Education x x 
Materials  x x 
Financing x x 
Facilities x 53 
Personnel/Manpower 74 x 
Research and Development x x 
Sophistication 11, 49, 50 2, 78 
Support to Cyber 
Operations 
50, 75 71, 78 
   Nodes 2.1 2.2 
 
Computer Sec. Org. 
Network 
Infrastructure 
Doctrine, Policy, Legal 71 64 
Organization x 2, 59 
Training and Education 20, 21, 22, 24 x 
Materials  29, 52 16, 26, 60 
Financing 2, 18, 41, 43 18 
Facilities 29 26, 60, 62 
Personnel/Manpower 21, 29, 42 x 
Research and Development 2, 24, 29, 32, 43, 52, 66 x 
Sophistication 14, 20, 22, 32, 52, 66 2 
Support to Cyber 
Operations 
14, 21, 32, 43 x 
   
   
 61 






Doctrine, Policy, Legal 71 71 
Organization x x 
Training and Education 20 20 
Materials  27, 29, 38, 59 27, 29, 38, 69 
Financing 2, 18, 43 2, 18, 43 
Facilities 29, 38, 47, 69 38, 69 
Personnel/Manpower 29, 42 42 
Research and Development 2, 29, 43, 69 2, 43, 66, 69 
Sophistication 14, 20, 38, 45, 69 14, 20, 38, 66, 69 
Support to Cyber 
Operations 
43, 78 14, 43, 78 
   Nodes 3.1 3.2 
 
Cryptographic Capability Forensics Capability 
Doctrine, Policy, Legal 59 x 
Organization x x 
Training and Education 20 20 
Materials  10, 29, 40, 67 29 
Financing 43 43 
Facilities 29 29 
Personnel/Manpower 29, 42 29, 42 
Research and Development 29, 30, 32, 39, 43, 66, 77 4, 29, 39, 43, 77 
Sophistication 10, 20, 23, 30, 32, 35, 37, 
39, 40, 52, 66, 77 
4, 20, 30, 35, 39, 77 
Support to Cyber 
Operations 
23, 30, 35, 67, 77 4, 30, 35, 77 
   Nodes 3.3 3.4 
 
Reverse Engineering NRL 
Doctrine, Policy, Legal x x 
Organization x x 
Training and Education x x 
Materials  29 x 
Financing 43 x 
Facilities 29 x 
Personnel/Manpower 29, 42 42 
Research and Development 4, 11, 29, 39, 43, 66, 77 23, 32, 39, 66, 77 
Sophistication 4, 30, 35, 39, 52, 66, 77 32, 35, 39, 66, 77 
Support to Cyber 
Operations 
4, 30, 35, 77 23, 32, 35, 77 
   
   







 Doctrine, Policy, Legal x 
 Organization x 
 Training and Education x 
 Materials  69 
 Financing x 
 Facilities 69 
 Personnel/Manpower 42 
 Research and Development 69 
 Sophistication 5, 9, 69 




   
   





Doctrine, Policy, Legal x x 
Organization x x 
Training and Education 7, 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 34, 
42, 60 
3, 19, 24 
Materials  27 x 
Financing 18 x 
Facilities 42 x 
Personnel/Manpower 21, 33, 60 x 
Research and Development x 24 
Sophistication 10, 19, 27, 28, 32,37 3, 20, 24, 75 
Support to Cyber 
Operations 
19, 21 3, 19, 20, 68 
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APPENDIX C   
CNO CAPABILITY MODEL GUIDE 
I. Overview 
The SIAM Cyber Warfare Capability Model is analytical tool based on 
Causal Strengths (CAST) Logic to determine the capability of a nation state to 
conduct sustained, offensive cyber operations.  CAST Logic is based on 
Bayesian mathematics, which allows for the evaluation of the cumulative effect 
that multiple causes may have on a single event.  The analyst is able to enter the 
confidence level of the information contained in the node, as well as the 
corresponding influence on the connecting node.  The analyst is also able to alter 
the information contained in the node along with the strength of the link, as more 
information is made available.  This provides for a readily updateable model that 
considers multiple indicators and relationships. 
II. Model 
The Cyber Warfare Capability Model is a four level model in which the 
analysts will inform nodes at the lowest level and define the relationships (links) 
between all nodes.  The analyst inputs data to inform the Level 4 nodes, which 
inform the level 3 nodes (Figure 12) and so on in a bottom up fashion.  The belief 
level of the nodes at levels 1, 2, and 3 will be computed from the causal 
relationships that influence them. 
A. Informing Nodes 
The analyst double clicks the desired Level 4 Node and defines the 
current belief of the node using a slide bar.  The analyst forms this decision 
based on the informing considerations presented in the comments tab.  The 
analyst is able to document and hyperlink source material under the Sources and 
Library tab.  The analyst can disregard nodes if information is not available by 
leaving the current belief as unknown. 
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B. Defining Links 
The analyst must define all links in the model.  The analyst double clicks 
the links and uses a slide bar to define the impact of the nodes if the premise is 
true or false.  This property allows the analyst to define whether it is a negative or 
positive relationship.  The model is largely based on positive relationships, 
therefore if the analysts defines a negative relationship it needs to be a 
conscious decision and properly reflected with the slide bar and comments. 
C. Run the Model 
The analyst clicks the exclamation mark in the upper right hand corner to 
run the model (belief evaluation).  The three tabs to the right of the exclamation 
mark provide impact analysis and pressure point evaluations. 
III. Summary 
The Capability Model may identify “key inputs” among all the selectors.  
This could be very useful in focusing the analyst on important information that 
deserves more attention than other factors.  The analysts should emphasize 
efforts towards defining relationships to this effect. 
          
Figure 12.   Level 4 nodes informing level 3 node 
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The Level 4 Nodes (Doctrine, Organization, etc.)  represent the traits of 
the Level 3 Node.  It is the Level 4 Nodes that represent the modified DOTMLPF 
analysis used to inform the Level 3 Nodes and that is where the analyst will input 
the data for the particular country of interest. 
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